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Thematic area: A) Financial reporting

Keywords: Tax fraud; earnings management; invoiceless sales; money laundering; shareholders loans
Abstract

The current study tests whether there was an empirical and positive relation between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books and the invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans were a vehicle adopted for “laundering” the proceeds of this accounting and tax fraud.

The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of such a positive relation. It suggests that at least a part of those loans is related to accounting and tax fraud, and these loans are the vehicle for “laundering” the proceeds of non recorded transactions and, simultaneously, keep the involved companies financially solvable.

The current study makes four main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it brings a novel perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature, that is not the usual context related to imports and exports activities; secondly, it shows that in the particular context described in the paper shareholders loans are used as a way of “laundering” the proceeds of invoiceless sales, and to keep companies solvable;thirdly, it connects the earnings management literature to the literature on fraud, also a novelty; fourthly, based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies, the study also makes a contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely by bringing information about the way tax evasion evolves in this region.
1- Introduction

In everyday life it may happen to Portuguese consumers to purchase a specific good or service and receive not from the seller the correspondent invoice. If the consumer requests it the seller tends to adopt one out of two attitudes: he/she looks the consumer with disfavor and issues the invoice; or tells the consumer that the issuance of the invoice implies to charge him/her the Value Added Tax (VAT). It is true that sometimes are consumers themselves that trigger invoiceless sales when ask the seller if it is possible not to invoice in order to avoid the VAT payment. This kind of behavior, either by consumers or by sellers, implies that a significant portion of goods and services traded in the economy is not invoiced.

These sales are a part of the so called “informal economy”, that in Portugal represents around 23% of GDP (e.g. Afonso & Gonçalves, 2009; Anno, 2007). Among other consequences, invoiceless sales imply a significant decrease in tax collection, namely VAT and Corporate Income Tax (CIT).

The dimension of the problem worries every government. This is apparent in the attitude of the Portuguese Tax Authority (PTA) that for a long time kept in the media and on its official site on the internet an advertising campaign subject to the theme “Please ask the bill. The bill moves the country forward”, seeking to raise citizens’ awareness for the social importance of always requesting the invoice.

A report on the newspaper Correio da Manhã, on the 2nd of April 2005, mentioned the intention of the PTA to inspect the accounting books of companies that potentially make a part of their business in the informal economy. The report added that “…one of the factors the PTA will be paying more attention is to the account of ‘shareholders loans’. It is through this mechanism that the company can sell in the informal economy and survive financially. Shareholders loans are the vehicle to introduce the cash in the company”.

In fact, companies making invoiceless sales have their accounting earnings managed downward, and the income tax bill shrank. However, unless such companies are able to buy the inputs in the informal economy, and pay them with undeclared funds, invoiceless sales practice sooner or later will tend to lead the company into treasury management problems, and difficulties in honoring financial commitments. To prevent this constraint, the financial amounts collected from invoiceless sales must be pumped into the company treasury. This can be done through shareholders financial loans, “laundering” the cash that was in the informal circuit and, at the same time, providing the funds that assure companies’ financial stability. Most Portuguese people know, or at least knew, one or more concrete situations of this type.

Under these circumstances, this paper aims to show whether there was an empirical connection between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books and the invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans are a vehicle adopted for “laundering” the proceeds of this accounting and tax fraud.

Two main factors motivate our study. Firstly, there is no evidence in the literature, at the national and international levels, shedding light on this type of fraud. The areas of fraudulent financial reporting and tax fraud “… have been somewhat

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1 For the sake of simplicity, throughout the paper we will label this type of loans as “shareholders loans”. However, for entities that take a legal structure of “limited liability partnership” a more precise definition would be “partners loans”.

2 Throughout the paper we will label corporate entities as “companies”, even when they have a partnership structure.
neglected in the literature” (DeFond, 2010:406), although these types of phenomena are costly for the society as a whole, a motive of strong inequality among citizens, and seems to be more widespread in the business world than one could expect. For DeFond (2010:406), “the relatively small number of papers that investigate [accounting] fraud may be due to difficulties in obtaining data on fraud other than those reported in AAER [Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases] .”. Thus, the current paper is a contribution to this almost empty research area, taking advantage of a particular economic, legal and social context that allows us to overcome some of the difficulties other researchers face when intend to enter the area of accounting and tax fraud. Moreover, this research goes beyond this already important contribution and sheds light on a particular way of achieving the “money laundering” of invoiceless sales proceeds.

Secondly, as we explained above, there is a particular context, a temporary window of opportunity, that makes possible the design of the research in a way that avoids the access to privileged corporate information, or even to the mentioned AAER. Until 2007, despite the PTA recurrent menaces, it was quite easy for Portuguese companies to introduce in their treasury the informal proceeds of invoiceless sales. They just needed to take these proceeds and record them in the books as shareholders loans. This implied thus that associated to increases in such loans one had a high probability of finding traces of invoiceless transactions. This is what we will be doing. It is a unique opportunity, namely because nowadays the legal and accounting mechanisms of control in place, namely more intense and regular audit inspections by the PTA when companies report increases in shareholders loans, and the bank system obligation to control the origin of all funds that enter a person or company account, even for small amounts, narrowed enormously companies window of opportunity for laundering the money related to the type of fraud activities we have mentioned.

This paper intends thus to make a contribution to the literature, and offer a better and structured understanding of this type of accounting and fiscal fraud, and also of its connection with the “money laundering” through shareholders loans. It grounds on the earnings management literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006), and extends it to take into account the extreme situation in which the operations are effective fraud, taking advantage of a particular context where anecdotal evidence shows the existence of the phenomenon. Moreover, our research also connects the earnings management literature to that of “money laundering” (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1998; Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008), making a contribution for a better understanding of phenomena that are usually treated in the literature as if they were independent.

The study adopts a relatively simple three-step methodology. Firstly, two subsamples of firms are assembled, one composed of companies with shareholders loans increases; the other, the control sample (e.g. Moreira, 2006), of companies with loans decreases. Gathering these subsamples, the global sample is composed of pairs of firms belonging to the same industry and year, and having identical size, but differentiating in the sign of the change in shareholders loans. Secondly, as we justify in detail later in the paper, invoiceless sales leave traces in the accounting numbers, not only in the cash flow that affects the treasury but also in companies’ gross margin. Companies are classified according to their fraud behavior into groups of “fraudster” and “non fraudster”, based on predictions of their abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) and cost of goods sold (COGS) (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). Thirdly, a model is developed and regressed to test the relationship between companies’ fraud behavior underlying invoiceless sales and the sign of shareholders loans change.
The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of a positive relation between shareholders loans increases and tax fraud through invoiceless sales. The evidence suggests that at least a part of those loans is related to accounting and tax fraud, and these loans are the vehicle for “laundering” the proceeds of informal transactions and, simultaneously, keep the involved companies financially solvable.

The current study makes four main contributions. Firstly, it brings a novel perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature (e.g. DeFond, 2010), highlighting an economic and corporate context of under-invoicing sales, in the limit invoiceless sales, that is not the usual context related to imports and exports activities and the attached use of transfer prices (e.g. Biswas & Marjit, 2005; Patnaik & Vasudevan, 2000). Secondly, it shows that in the particular context described in the paper shareholders loans are used as a way of “laundering” the proceeds of invoiceless sales, serving simultaneously to keep companies solvable. This double purpose of the “money laundering” vehicle is in itself also a novelty in the literature, contributing for a better understanding of what can be in each moment and context the determinants underlying the choice of the vehicles adopted to reintroduce illicit money in the formal economy. Thirdly, adopting a design and research tools borrowed from the earnings management literature to study a fraud problem, the paper also brings a contribution by relating somewhat that literature to the one on fraud (e.g. DeFond, 2010). Fourthly, based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies, our study also makes a contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely by bringing information about the way tax evasion evolves in this region (e.g. Richardson, 2006).

On a more practical perspective, this study is of particular interest for the PTA, because of the contribution it makes to a better understanding of Portuguese business reality and the relation between companies, buyers and that Authority. Moreover, it is also of interest for similar authorities in other countries that face similar challenges in coping with tax evasion and “money laundering”.

The study contains five additional sections. Section 2 comprises a literature review on incentives to earnings management, accounting and tax fraud and “money laundering,” and displays a brief characterization of the Portuguese economic and legal context. In section 3, the research hypothesis is developed and discussed. Section 4 shows and justifies the methodology used. The empirical results are discussed in section 5, as well as those arising from robustness tests that have been carried out. Finally, a summary of the main conclusions and contributions is made available in section 6.

2- Literature review: from earnings management and accounting fraud practices to “money laundering” in the Portuguese context

Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as the result of managers accounting choices in a way that generates a gain for themselves or for companies they work for. These choices are, at first, within the law and allowed by accounting standards flexibility. However, they can be of fraudulent nature, for example in the case of under-invoicing or of invoiceless sales, which go beyond the standards and the law. In the context of empirical studies, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the impact of legal from illegal actions. In the context of the current study, as explained in the introduction, the specific time and context frame allows to define companies’ actions as fraudulent. However, even in this case, we are unable to assure that the adopted research design is not picking up also legal (earnings management) actions. Thus, we ground our research on the earnings management literature, and adopt for this term a broader scope that goes beyond managers’ mere use of...
accounting standards flexibility (Ball, 2009). Beyond the illegality of fraud, empirically its main consequence is that it does not imply the “reversion of the earnings effects” as it tends to happen in legal earnings management actions.

2.1- Incentives to undertake earnings management and tax fraud

2.1.1- Generic incentives

The literature on the empirical study of opportunistic earnings management through accruals date back to Healy (1985). The incentives managers face to undertake such kind of action are diverse, and the following are the most commonly discussed: to affect their bonuses (e.g. Guidry et al., 1999; Healy & Wahlen, 1999) or the company’s debt agreements (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996; Sweeney, 1994); to circumvent the regulations (Jones, 1991); to meet capital markets expectations (e.g. Burgstahler & Eames, 2003; Cheng & Warfield, 2005). Thus, accounting choices underlying earnings management tend to be influenced by political, contractual and agency costs (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

However, such incentives have been mainly studied for listed companies of Anglo-Saxon countries, thus avoiding a direct relation to the incentives faced by managers of unlisted companies managed by their owners, where agency conflicts with shareholders have no place, and political costs tend to be nonexistent.

The research focused on earnings management incentives of unlisted companies operating in economic and institutional contexts of “continental” type is more recent. Such incentives have been studied, among others, by Burgstahler et al. (2006), Garrod et al. (2008) and Moreira (2006). These studies offer empirical evidence that the main earnings management incentives, in contexts where accounting and taxation are closely linked, tend to be the minimization of the income tax, and to obtain bank financing in good conditions. Although such literature do not explicitly discuss the fraud issue, it is apparent that the economic and business environment underlying the activity of this type of firms, and in most cases the absence of auditors that control the quality of their accounting information, permits one to see fraud as a higher level of earnings management actions (e.g. Young, 2004). Moreover, in the context of these firms, where the manager most times is the owner, it is easier to see some of the determinants of tax evasion discussed by Richardson (2006), like low education, or a low rate of tax compliance.

2.1.2- Incentives to minimize the income tax

The economic and institutional context surrounding companies seems to be a determinant of the nature of their earnings management incentives. For example, in a study for countries of the European Union (EU) Burgstahler et al. (2006) found that the existence of a strong link between accounting and tax rules is associated with greater downward earnings management in order to minimize income tax. In the same way Garrod et al. (2008) for a similar context.

The Portuguese case does not seem to be different, and it is a fact that there is very close relation between accounting and taxation. However, companies tend not to avoid completely the payment of taxes. Instead, because the Tax Authority (PTA) audits companies disclosing losses, they pursue to disclose small positive earnings, minimizing the tax payment (Moreira, 2007), unless they adopt stronger actions deemed as fraud, like invoiceless sales.
The tax incentive, regardless the economic and institutional context, seems to have less impact on listed companies. Their professional management, and sophisticated tax planning strategies, instead of downward earnings management, are deemed as the main justifications for such a lower impact.

2.1.3–Incentives to obtain best financing conditions

Accounting research displays evidence that accounting information plays a major role in debt agreements, indirectly affecting the underlying interest rates (e.g. Asquith et al., 2005). According to Akerlof (1970), companies tend to manage earnings upwards in an attempt not to violate the accomplishment of contracts, thus avoiding increases in their financing cost. In the case of Portuguese Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME), which depend on the bank system to obtain funds, the financial information that they use to support their financing requests not only can have an effect on the cost of such a financing but is also a basic condition to access it. In order to reduce the information asymmetry, and the effect of earnings management, financial institutions tend to support their decisions also in qualitative and complementary information like, for example, the quality of their management (e.g. Epps & Ismail, 2009).

Good corporate governance mechanisms tend to constrain fraud and earnings management attitudes, thus affecting positively the level of financing costs. In the case of unlisted companies of small size, the agency problems will be lower or nonexistent, since the manager tends to be the owner. Those having an earnings management incentive to obtain the best financing conditions tend to manage earnings upwards - or constrain manipulation in the downward direction - in order to better signal the quality of the company. The evidence in Moreira (2007) supports this intuition, and Huyghebaert et al. (2007) found similar evidence, for a set of Belgium start-ups, showing that such companies managed earnings upwards in the years previous to their first loan request to financial institutions.

Giving the evidence discussed in this and in the previous subsections, one concludes that the tax incentive and the incentive to optimize financing conditions push companies to undertake earnings management actions, and in the limit accounting and tax fraud.

2.2-Methods of earnings manipulation and money laundering

Earnings manipulation methods can be classified into three groups: those based on the ability and flexibility of accounting choice; those based on the use of real earnings management activities; and those concerning the fraudulent manipulation of financial information or corporate transactions.

On concerning the first group, the manipulation tends to occur in the domain of the accounting estimates, likewise deprecations, provisions, impairments. These practices tend to be more common in Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Bowen et al., 1995; Christie & Zimmerman, 1994), because of the milder impact of tax rules on companies accounting decisions. Portuguese accounting standardsshave such flexibility but its tend not to be much used for the purpose of manipulation, because companies use mainly fiscal rules in making their accounting choices. For example, they use the maximum rates of depreciation allowed for tax purposes, instead of the economic ones; or the percentage of losses for bad debts impairments allowed by the Corporate Tax Law.

As refer Dechow et al. (1996), this goal cannot be achieved if the manipulation is made public.
On concerning real practices of earnings management, the available evidence suggests that managers do temporary reductions in the sales price to increase the turnover, and discretional minimize expenses to increase disclosed margins (Roychowdhury, 2006). Other practices adopted include, for example, the increase of sales at the end of the period, accepting its return by customers in the beginning of the next (Penman, 2008). Both cases are situations that fall into the gray area that divides earnings management from the mere business management, although the latter case could even be considered as fraudulent.

In terms of fraudulent manipulation the solutions are more diverse and less easy to assemble in well-defined groups. The invoiceless of sales, discussed in the current paper, is one of the methods used for earnings reduction and tax evasion. The literature seldom discusses this type of manipulation (DeFond, 2010), due to the difficulty to systematize how it is practiced, and also of detecting and measuring it empirically. Nevertheless, there are studies that provide empirical evidence on the existence of fraud in financial statements (e.g. Kaminski et al., 2004; Persons, 1995; Skousen et al., 2009).

There is a link between accounting fraud and money laundering, and accounting professionals can play very important rolls in drawing it (e.g. Compin, 2008; Sikka & Hampton, 2005). For Mitchell et al. (1998), accountants and auditors may use their expertise to create complex webs of transactions with the purpose of “cleaning” illicit funds. According to Masiandaro (1999), money laundering has two key-characteristics: illegality, that implies the use of revenues originated illegally or in criminal activities, or revenues that haven’t been reported to the tax authority (Sarigul, 2013); and concealment, because the first goal of money laundering is to hide the illegal source of such revenues.

Shareholders loans related to invoiceless sales fit Masiandaro (1999) definition. They use illegal money, that haven’t been reported for tax purposes, and conceal the origin of the funds, taking advantage of existing soft bank and tax rules. Moreover, as mentioned previously, such loans were more than the adoption of a mere money laundering technique, because they were a basic way of keeping solvable companies making invoiceless sales.

Shareholders loans can thus be seen as a technique adding to the common lists of methods and techniques for money laundering (e.g. Quirk, 1997; Sarigul, 2013), where the most common is smurfing, i.e. the use of multiple cash deposits in multiple bank accounts for amounts below the minimum cash reporting requirement.

2.3- Economic, institutional and social Portuguese context

As previously mentioned, the incentives to undertake earnings management seem to be closely related to the economic, institutional and social context in which the firms are embedded. This justifies a brief summary of the main factors that characterize the Portuguese case. Four main characteristics (Moreira, 2007): i) a strong alignment between ownership and management, which means that most companies are managed by their owners and thus there are no related agency conflicts; ii) business financing is obtained essentially through banks; iii) the current legal system is of code-law type, in the sense that it is described by Ball et al. (2000); and there is a very close relationship between the accounting and tax systems; iv) the “tax morale” (Richardson, 2006) tends to be low, i.e. the moral principles or values individuals hold about paying taxes tend to be weak, mainly because citizens do not have a good relationship with the State. This explains, at least partly, the high level of Portuguese tax evasion.
Companies in Portugal are generally SME, wherein, in addition to being managed by the owners, their corporate structure is mostly familiar. This implies that the company’s interests match exactly those of the manager/shareholder, justifying that one of the earnings management main incentives is the minimization of corporate taxes, conditional on the need to obtain bankfinancing.

The academic and financial qualifications of SME entrepreneurs/managers tend to be low, and they tend not to use accounting as a management tool. Therefore, the main function of these companies’ accounting is to fulfill a legal request and to support the estimation of the income tax. This specific context explains why companies financial reporting tends to be based on fiscal rather than on economic criteria.

3- Discussion of the research hypothesis

Let’s remind that the aim of this study is to discuss whether there is an empirical connection in between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books and the invoiceless sales they make, i.e. that such loans are a vehicle adopted by some companies for “laundering” the proceeds of this fraud.

Anecdotal evidence of companies’ daily life, and of known results of upward tax corrections applied by the PTA, allow expecting that accounting and tax fraud occurs, at least partly, through invoiceless sales. It is also informally known that companies tend to acquire in the formal circuit, and record in their books, the inputs underlying invoiceless sales, implying that their costs will not suffer the same downward impact as their revenues, making the gross margin decline. Earnings are negatively affected, as intended, and companies’ treasury will suffer the grip resulting from the asymmetric evolution of costs and receipts. It will be difficult for the company to ensure payments to suppliers and other creditors unless the proceeds of invoiceless sales are reintroduced in the treasury. In such a context, shareholders loans are adopted as a vehicle that has the double purpose of “laundering” those proceeds, reintroducing them in the formal economy, and keep the company financially solvable.

Thus, in sum, this fraud process has two main consequences. Firstly, there is a negative impact on companies’ recorded turnover, and on the gross margin because they tend to record in their accounting all purchased inputs. Secondly, the treasury is negatively affected, constraining companies in solving timely their financial commitments, unless the proceeds of the invoiceless sales are “laundered” and enter companies’ accounting books. This is expected to be accomplished through shareholders loans.

This general intuition is synthesized in the following hypothesis:

\[ H1- \text{ Shareholders loans increases are related to accounting and tax fraud through invoiceless sales.} \]

The next subsection introduces the methodology and statistical sample adopted to test this hypothesis.

4- Methodology and sample selection

4.1-The use of a control subsample

The current research aims to test whether shareholders loans increases are positively related to invoiceless sales. To this end, two subsamples were created:
one composed of companies with positive changes (increases) in those loans; another, deemed as a control sample, gathering companies with negative changes. These subsamples were built in a way that each company of the control subsample finds a pair in the first one in terms of size, year and industry. For companies’ size purpose we adopted the natural logarithm of total assets. The industries were defined as a two-digit code of the Portuguese industry classification (v.3).

4.2–Classification of invoiceless sales companies

As previously explained, it is expected that invoiceless sales influence negatively the gross margin, because the sales recorded are lower than actual sales and at least a part of the inputs underlying the invoiceless sales tend to be recorded in the books. This asymmetric movement implies two consequences: the COGS increase relatively to the volume of invoiced sales; the CFO deteriorates beyond the effect of the invoiceless sales.

The assumption that the cost of all inputs tends to be recorded as a cost, regardless of the sales invoicing nature, is based on anecdotal concrete evidence. It permits us to classify the companies regarding their invoiceless sales behavior based on two models available in the literature to detect earnings management through real activities (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Ge & Kim, 2014; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006).

The first model, adapted from Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), allows the estimation of the normal level of COGS based on companies’ revenue:

\[
\frac{COGS_t}{TA_{t-1}} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \frac{1}{TA_{t-1}} + \alpha_3 \frac{REV_t}{TA_{t-1}} + \xi_t
\]

where,

- \( COGS_t \) - Cost of goods sold of year \( t \);
- \( REV_t \) - Revenues of year \( t \);
- \( TA_{t-1} \) - Total assets at the end of year \( t-1 \);
- \( \xi_t \) - The model residuals.

Because the intercept \( \alpha_1 \) absorbs the average effect of the uncorrelated omitted variables of the model, in this particular case at least the control for the impact of invoiceless sales on the COGS, it is expect that coefficient to be higher for firms having invoiceless sales (YIS) than for firms with no invoiceless sales (NIS). As suggested by Moreira (2006), when the model is estimated cross-sectionally by industry with no control for invoiceless sales, one may expect that the size of the intercept will lie somewhere in between the extreme cases characterised by having only one type of sales (NIS or YIS). Let us call it the “average intercept” \( \alpha_{av} \). Given the higher impact of REV on COGS for invoiceless sales companies, it is expected that this intercept is understated for YIS firms, and overstated for NIS firms, i.e. \( \alpha_{1YIS} > \alpha_{1NIS} > \alpha_{av} \). The consequence is the existence of a measurement error (ERR) that translates into the estimation of COGS and is defined as \( ERR1 = COGS_t - \hat{COGS}_t \). It follows the following expectation: \( ERR1_{YIS} > 0 \) and \( ERR1_{NIS} < 0 \).

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4 The Portuguese Industry Classification v.3 is closely linked to the NACE - Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community v.2.

5 The “gross profit margin”, or simply the “gross margin”, is defined as the revenue (sales + services) minus the cost of goods sold and consumed.
The second model, adapted from Ge and Kim (2014), is used to estimate the normal level $CFO$ (Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006):

$$\frac{CFO_t}{A_{t-1}} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \frac{1}{A_{t-1}} + \beta_3 \frac{REV_t}{A_{t-1}} + \beta_4 \frac{\Delta REV_t}{A_{t-1}} + \epsilon_t$$ (2)

where $CFO$ is the cash flows from operations and $\Delta REV_t$ is the change in revenues, both in year $t$. The other variables are defined as per equation (1).6

To discuss the impact of invoiceless sales on the estimation of $CFO$ we adopt a deductive reasoning similar to the one used in model (1). For a given amount of recorded revenue, the impact on $CFO$ of the cost of the inputs underlying the sales tends to be higher for YIS than for NIS companies. This means that it is expected the $CFO$ will be smaller for companies classified as a YIS, because the cost of the inputs that impact $CFO$ is higher than for a NIS company, given that such a cost is expected to be related to an amount of sales higher than that recorded in the books. This implies that the “average intercept” ($\beta_{1\text{inv}}$) is expected to follow this hierarchy:

$$\beta_{NIS} > \beta_{YIS} > \beta_{NIS}.$$ Defining $ERR2 = CFO_t - CFO_{\text{expected}}$, then it is expected that:

$$ERR2_{YIS} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad ERR2_{NIS} > 0.$$

Based on the above models, and on the economic intuition underlying each of them, we define a variable to classify fraudster companies based on the methodology proposed by Gunny (2010), the “invoiceless sales companies” variable ($ISC$).

Companies having an estimated $ERR2$ less than or equal to the 1st quartile of the distribution of such measurement errors, i.e., that have $CFO$ quite below the normal expectation, are more likely to have undertook invoiceless sales. The same is true for companies that have an estimated $ERR1$ greater than or equal to the 3rd quartile of the distribution of this type of measurement error, i.e., having COGS above the normal expectation. Thus, companies that most likely made invoiceless sales are those that fill simultaneously both conditions.

According to Gunny (2010), there is a simple way of combining both criteria and define a unique classifying variable. Firstly, both error variables distributions are sorted in ascending or descending order. Secondly, the distribution of one of these variables is multiplied by minus one, in order to get its symmetric. We have chosen the $ERR1$ variable, and named it $SERR1$. Thirdly, each observation of $SERR1$s is summed with its counterpart in the $ERR2$ sorted distribution, creating the variable $\Sigma ERR$. In this new distribution companies that most likely made invoiceless sales are those with the lowest $\Sigma ERR$ values. Thus, finally, the $ISC$ variable is defined as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the value of $\Sigma ERR$ for particular observation is less than or equal to the 1st quartile of its distribution, 0 otherwise.

### 4.3- The model

The aim of the current research is to test whether shareholders loans are related to accounting and tax fraud by invoiceless sales. As the working hypothesis states, we predict a positive relationship between increases of such debts and the existence of this type of manipulation. The global model, estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is the following:

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6The models (1) and (2) are estimated cross-sectionally by year and industry whenever this has at least 15 observations (Roychowdhury, 2006) in the sample-base defined in subsection 4.4 above.
The dependent variable of the model is the change in shareholders loans (ΔLOA), using ISC as the main variable that qualifies companies as fraudster by invoiceless sales. The other are control variables. The complete set of variables is defined as follows:

\[ ΔLOA_{it} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 ISC_{it} + \alpha_3 D_{it} + \alpha_4 ISC_{it} + \alpha_5 \Delta WC_{it} + \alpha_6 ΔFIXA_{it} + \alpha_7 ΔDCI_{it} + \alpha_8 SIZE_{it} + \alpha_9 ΔLOA_{it} \]  

(3)

- \( ΔLOA_{it} \) - Changes in shareholders loans of company \( i \) and year \( t \), deflated by lagged total assets;
- \( ISC_{it} \) - Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if company, in year \( t \), is classified as a fraudster by invoiceless sales, 0 otherwise. Given the above discussion, we expect its coefficient to be positive;
- \( D_{it} \) - Dummy variable that characterizes the sign of the change in shareholders loans, taking value 1 if the observation belongs to the subsample of companies with \( ΔLOA > 0 \), 0 if the observation belongs to the subsample of companies with \( ΔLOA < 0 \);
- \( D^*ISC_{it} \) - Interactive variable defined as the product of variables \( D \) and \( ISC \), intended to control for potential differences in companies behavior towards invoiceless sales. Its coefficient is predicted to be positive;
- \( ΔWC_{it} \) - Change in working capital of company, in year \( t \), deflated by lagged total assets. Given that shareholders loans can be used to increase companies working capital, we predict its coefficient to be positive;
- \( ΔFIXA_{it} \) - Change of fixed assets of company, in year \( t \), deflated by lagged total assets. Since one of the potential uses of shareholders loans is the acquisition of fixed assets, we predict its coefficient to be positive;
- \( ΔDCI_{it} \) - Changes of debts to financial institutions of company, in year \( t \), deflated by lagged total assets. This variable intends to control whether the use of shareholders loans and the bank loans are substitutes. We expect its coefficient to be negative;
- \( SIZE_{it} \) - Size of company, in year \( t \), proxied by total assets natural logarithm. It is assumed that small companies are more likely to make invoiceless transactions, and thus we predict its coefficient to be negative;
- \( AUDIT_{it} \) - Dummy variable that controls for the existence of an auditor in year \( t \), a way of constraining the occurrence of invoiceless sales and thus the use of shareholders loans. It takes 1 if there is an auditor, 0 otherwise, and the expected sign of its coefficient is negative;
- \( LF_{it} \) - Dummy variable taking value 1 if the legal structure of the company is a limited company, 0 if it is a limited liability partnership. It is assumed that the use of shareholders loans arising from invoiceless sales is easier for the latter given their smaller number of partners that makes less difficult to get an agreement on such a matter. Thus, it is expected its coefficient to be negative;
- \( IMPEXP_{it} \) - Dummy variable taking value 1 if the company has import/export activity, 0 otherwise. Due to existence of control procedures and extra documentation, it is assumed that companies with this type of activity may have additional difficulties to make invoiceless sales, and therefore to have related shareholders loans. Thus, it is expected its coefficient to be negative;
- \( SUB_{it} \) - Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is deemed as an affiliate/subsidiary of another company, 0 otherwise. In affiliates/subsidiary companies shareholders loans can be the visible effect of the financial relations in the group. Thus, we predict its coefficient to be positive;
- Set of dummy variables that take value 1 if the observation belongs to a particular industry, 0 otherwise. We do not issue a prediction about the sign of these variables;

- Set of dummy variables that take value 1 if the observation belongs to year, 0 otherwise. Also in this case we do not issue a prediction about the sign of their coefficients;

- Estimation error which complies with the classical assumptions of the models estimated by OLS.

The continuous variables are deflated by lagged total assets. This procedure is intended to circumvent heteroscedasticity problems (e.g. García-Teruel et al., 2009; Jones, 1991).

4.4- Selection of the sample and descriptive statistics

The sample includes limited companies (hereafter LTD) and limited liability partnerships (hereafter LLP) available in the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (SABI), database of Bureau van Dijk, with data for the years 1998-2007. As already discussed, the global sample is composed of two subsamples and each of them matches the other by size, year and industry. The main difference in between them lies on the sign of the change in shareholders loans.

Table 1 describes the sample selection. Listed, financial and companies belonging to the public sector were deleted in the selection process because they are expected to have distinct incentives and freedom to make invoiceless sales (e.g. Coppens & Peek, 2005).

Table 1-Sample selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N. Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SABI data base (2009). The number of companies and partnerships reaches 28814, for the period 1998-2007</td>
<td>288140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After removal of listed, financial sector, and public sector companies</td>
<td>243072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After deletion of missing data and lagging of variables</td>
<td>102181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After imposing a minimum of 15 observations per industry and year</td>
<td>101389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After elimination of observations with ΔLOA null or missing, and outliers (1% +1%) of this and other variables</td>
<td>8416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the matching process, observations in each subsample</td>
<td>2327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global sample</td>
<td>4654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To estimate models (1) and (2) we eliminated all industries with less than 15 observations per year (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006). To estimate model (3), we considered only observations with ΔLOA positive or negative. After deletion of outliers (1% +1%) for variables ΔLOA, ΔWC, ΔFIXA and ΔDCI, by year and industry, the number of observations reduced to 8416. This was the basis to define two (mirrored) subsamples having 2327 observations each.

7All statistical treatment is carried out using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software.
8Since 2007 changes in the tax rules circumvent enormously companies’ window of opportunity to use shareholders loans as a money laundering technique.
After regressing models (1) and (2), basic descriptive statistics were estimated in order to describe the subsamples. Table 2-Panel A displays such statistics.

**Table 2 - Descriptive statistics**

**Panel A: Characterization of the subsamples**

| Variables          | Mean  | Median | Pr>|t| | Mean  | Median | Pr>|Z| |
|--------------------|-------|--------|------|-------|--------|------|
|                    | LOA>0 | LOA<0  |       | LOA>0 | LOA<0  |       |
| Abnormal CFO       | -0.241| -0.168 | 0.107 | -0.027| 0.008  | 0.000 |
| Abnormal COGS      | 0.021 | 0.015  | 0.784 | 0.029 | 0.017  | 0.006 |
| Returnonassets     | 0.025 | 0.041  | 0.000 | 0.029 | 0.036  | 0.000 |
| Financial leverage | 0.227 | 0.288  | 0.000 | 0.228 | 0.274  | 0.000 |
| Loans/Liabilities  | 0.221 | 0.159  | 0.000 | 0.150 | 0.086  | 0.000 |
| Bankloans/Liabilities | 0.250 | 0.270  | 0.001 | 0.217 | 0.236  | 0.013 |
| Assetturnover      | 1.292 | 1.373  | 0.036 | 1.002 | 1.093  | 0.000 |

**Notes:**

1) "Abnormal COGS" are the residuals of model (1), also labeled ERR1, and "abnormal CFO" are the residuals of model (2), ERR2. "Return on Assets" is the ratio of operating earnings to total assets. "Financial leverage" is the ratio of equity to total assets. "Assetturnover" is the ratio of total revenue to total assets. \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) (\( \Delta \text{LOA}<0 \ )) is the subsample of companies with positive (negative) change in loans.

2) Pr>|t| (Pr>|Z|) is the level of significance for the difference of means (medians) in between subsamples [t-Test (Wilcoxon Test)].

3) The number of observations per subsample is 2327.

The table shows that the value of the statistics for the \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) subsample are consistently and significantly lower, for the mean and median, with the exception of abnormal COGS and the ratio Loans/Liabilities for the mean. As expected, although the difference is significant only at the median level, abnormal CFO that proxies for invoiceless sales is negative and lower in companies with \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) (-0.241 vs. -0.168), as discussed in subsection 4.2. Another sign of this behavior is the abnormal COGS that is positive and higher for companies in the \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) subsample, also consistent with the previous discussion, although the difference to \( \Delta \text{LOA}<0 \) is statistically significant only at median level. Thus, \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) companies show lower CFO than should record (justifying the negative sign) and higher COGS than it would be normal given the actual sales volume. This evidence is in line with the expectations underlying the research hypothesis (H1).

Since the subsamples are mirrored by size, industry and year, as already mentioned, the difference for the return on assets seems to be the outcome of lower sales volume and lower gross margin recorded by \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) companies. This evidence and potential explanation is also consistent with the expectation underlying the research hypothesis (H1), which assumes that \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) companies manage earnings downwards by making invoiceless sales, and record the cost of the inputs underlying such sales, thus increasing the COGS. This predicted behavior for \( \Delta \text{LOA}>0 \) companies may also explain their lower financial leverage (Equity/Total assets), given the impact
that invoiceless sales have on the financial structure, deteriorating it over time. Moreover, a low financial leverage makes more difficult to get bank funding and puts pressure on shareholders to lend money to these companies.

**Panel B: Analysis of the model (3) variables by subsample**

| Variables | $\Delta$LOA $> 0$ | $\Delta$LOA $< 0$ | $Pr>|t|$ | $\Delta$LOA $> 0$ | $\Delta$LOA $< 0$ | $Pr>|Z|$ |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|
| $\Delta$LOA | 0.055             | -0.046            | 0.000     | 0.024             | -0.019            | 0.000     |
| $\Delta$WC  | 0.052             | 0.022             | 0.000     | 0.028             | 0.009             | 0.000     |
| $\Delta$FIXA | 0.034             | 0.047             | 0.619     | -0.001            | -0.005            | 0.000     |
| $\Delta$DCI | 0.020             | 0.047             | 0.046     | 0.000             | 0.000             | 0.000     |
| SIZE       | 15.055            | 15.065            | 0.763     | 14.923            | 14.944            | 0.817     |

Notes:
1) Variables definition: $\Delta$LOA- Change in loans; $\Delta$WC- Change in working capital; $\Delta$FIXA- Change in fixed assets; $\Delta$DCI-Change in debt to financial institutions, all the previous variables deflated by lagged total assets. SIZE- Company size defined as the natural logarithm of total assets;

2) $Pr>|t|$ ($Pr>|Z|$) is the level of significance for the difference of means (medians) in between the subsamples [t-Test (Wilcoxon Test)];

3) The proportion of LLP companies in the subsamples is 65.5% (63.9%) for $\Delta$LOA $> 0$ ($\Delta$LOA $< 0$). The weight of companies with audited accounts is 44% in both subsamples. Companies classified as IMP/EXP are 44% (45.2%) for subsample $\Delta$LOA $> 0$ ($\Delta$LOA $< 0$). The proportion of companies that are subsidiaries of other companies is approximately 2% in both subsamples. Therefore, the subsamples are balanced concerning these variables.

4) The number of observations per subsample is 2327.

The statistics displayed in Table 2- Panel B tend to be consistent with our expectations, and for most variables the subsamples show significant differences. Also as expected, undisclosed evidence shows that the percentage of observations classified as belonging to invoiceless sales companies (variable ISCTakes value 1) is larger in subsample $\Delta$LOA $> 0$ (30.08%) than in subsample $\Delta$LOA $< 0$ (21.66%).

In the next subsection we discuss the empirical results of model (3).

5- Empirical results

In the previous subsections we discussed the research hypothesis (H1), the model (3) to test it, and the data. Now we analyse the empirical evidence available from its estimation.

5.1- Relation of shareholders loans with invoiceless transactions fraud

Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients. We remind that the main objective of the test is to check whether the increase in shareholders loans is related to the invoiceless sales.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
<th>Coefficient (P-value)</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.027 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>∆LOA&gt;0</td>
<td>0.002 (0.698)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>∆LOA&lt;0</td>
<td>0.047 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆WC</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.059 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆FIXA</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.000 (0.935)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆DCI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.128 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000 (0.855)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUDIT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000 (0.134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000 (0.961)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPEXP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.024 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>33.25</td>
<td>32.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) Variables definition: ISC - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is classified as fraudster by invoiceless transactions, 0 otherwise; AUDIT - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company report is audited, 0 otherwise; LF - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the legal structure is a limited company, 0 if it is a limited liability partnership; IMPEXP - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company has importing/exporting activity, 0 otherwise; SUB - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is deemed an affiliate/subsidiary of another company, 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are as per Table 2-Painel B;
2) The model was regressed with a set of control variables for year and industry. For the sake of parsimony their coefficients were not displayed. Observations per subsample, 2327.

The model is globally significant and its explanatory power has an Adjusted $R^2$ of 32.35%. The coefficients of the variables tend to show the expected sign, and the relationship between the increase in shareholders loans and the variable that classifies companies as fraudster by invoiceless sales (ISC) is positive and significant for the subsample ∆LOA>0 (0.027), and is not significant for the subsample ∆LOA<0 (0.002). This evidence supports hypothesis H1, showing that such a relation exists and is significant at the conventional degree of statistical confidence.9

The positive and significant coefficient of ∆FIXA suggests that a part of the increase in shareholders loans may be motivated by the need to finance fixed assets investment. However, even after controlling for this effect, and for a similar effect on the

---

9The multiplicative variable $D^iISC$ allows to test whether the relation is the same for both subsamples. The aggregate coefficient for the $∆LOA<0$ subsample is given by the coefficient of ISC, and for $∆LOA>0$ by the sum of coefficients ISC + $D^iISC$. 
change in working capital ($\Delta WC$), the coefficient on ISC is significant. This means that at least partly shareholders loans are related to invoiceless sales. In the next subsection we will return to this relationship.

Unexpectedly, the AUDIT variable shows a no significant coefficient, suggesting that auditors are unable to control the deep source of (at least part of) shareholders loans. A potential explanation for this result may be the fact that auditors’ role is not to control the existence of fraud, rather to assure companies’ compliance with accounting standards. On concerning the change in debt to financial institutions ($\Delta DCI$), the coefficient is as expected and suggests that shareholders loans may act as a substitute for bank loans.

The variable SIZE unexpectedly shows a no significant coefficient, suggesting that shareholders loans are not driven by company size. Contrarily, shareholders loans in companies that have a group relationship (SUB) are at least partly driven by such group connections. Companies’ legal structure (LF) and the IMP/EXP activity (IMPEXP) do not seem to affect shareholders loans, showing not significant coefficients.

Table 4 displays additional evidence that give extra support to our hypothesis, displaying a set of positive and significant coefficients for the IND control variables. Among the 46 industries controlled in the analysis, only 7 (15.22%) shows this type of coefficient. Most of these industries were often mentioned in the media as being fraudster by invoiceless sales.

Thus, the collected evidence suggests that at least a part of shareholders loans is related to fraud activity. This relationship occurs even after controlling for various determinants that may affect the existence of positive changes in shareholders loans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IND</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(P-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agriculture, animal production, hunting and related service activities</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Printing and reproduction of media</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Manufacturing equipment, communications equipment, and electronic and optical products</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Collection, treatment activities; materials recovery</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Restaurants and similar</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: IND - Two-digit codes of the Portuguese industry classification (CAE v.3); this Table displays only the positive and statistically significant (at less than 10%) coefficients.

In the next subsection we develop some robustness tests in order to assess the strength of the results discussed so far.
5.2- Robustness tests

Additional tests were performed. The first one tested two aspects already discussed above: the relationship between changes in shareholders loans and changes in the investment in fixed assets; the possibility of changes in shareholders loans being mere loans between the mother company and its subsidiaries.

Using the previous methodology, we began by subtracting to the positive change in shareholders loans the positive changes in fixed asset, neutralizing this way the impact of investment. Then we eliminated from the samples companies classified as subsidiaries of other companies, implying to remove larger companies where shareholders loans may not be related to invoiceless sales. Given these adjustments, variables $\text{FIXA}$ and $\Delta \text{SUB}$ were removed from the original model. The results are displayed in Table 5.

Table 5-Changes in shareholders loans after controlling for fixed assets investment and group relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
<th>Subsample</th>
<th>Coefficient (P-value)</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{LOA}&gt;0$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>$\text{ISC}$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{LOA}&lt;0$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\Delta \text{WC}$</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{DCI}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\Delta \text{DCI}$</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{SIZE}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\text{SIZE}$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{AUDIT}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\text{AUDIT}$</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{LF}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\text{LF}$</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{IMPEXP}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$\text{IMPEXP}$</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.867)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJUST. $R^2$ (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The variables definition is as per Table 2-Panel B and Table 3. Each subsample has 1850 obs.

The evidence in this table is qualitatively similar to that in Table 3. Thus, after having controlled for the effect of positive changes in fixed asset and group relations, the evidence still supports the intuition underlying the research hypothesis: changes in shareholders loans are related to fraud by invoiceless sales.

Other tests were performed: i) the model was regressed for limited companies only, and the results were qualitatively the same as before; ii) the model was regressed for subsidiaries only, and in this case the relationship ceases to exist, suggesting that for these companies shareholders loans are not significantly related to invoiceless sales. A potential reason for this result may be the size of companies belonging to groups that could constrain somehow invoiceless sales fraud; iii) based on the evidence in Table 2- Panel A, we also controlled for companies profitability in order to assess whether it is related to fraud behavior. Companies were divided into two groups based on their profitability: the more and the less profitable. The evidence shows that such behavior is related to changes in shareholders loans in both groups, discharging the idea that such loans could occur only on less profitable companies as a way shareholders used to overcome the impact on the cash flow arising from lack of
profitability; iv) we then controlled for the type of industry, in order to assess whether companies behavior is homogeneous across industries. The model was regressed only for a set of industries that were expected not to make invoiceless sales, and the ISCoefficient for the subsample $\Delta \text{LOA}>0$ was no longer statistically significant, and the relation to shareholders loans had disappeared. This evidence adds robustness to our results, and shows that the characteristics of the industry concerning invoiceless sales is a key factor in explaining shareholders loans; v) we adopted different dependent variables, by adding to these loans, one at a time, equity increases and other changes in equity. The overall evidence is qualitatively similar to the one discussed above; vi) we also controlled for the nature of companies’ activity (industrial, commercial or service). Also in this case, the results are robust and supportive of our hypothesis.

In summary, the empirical evidence collected in these tests supports the findings discussed in the previous subsection, i.e. it supports the hypothesis that companies making alleged invoiceless sales fraud use shareholders loans as a vehicle to introduce in their treasury the money that were generated in the informal economy.

6- Conclusion

The current study tested whether there was an empirical and positive relation between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies' books and the invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans were a vehicle adopted for "laundering" the proceeds of this fraud.

The existence of a particular context, a temporary window of opportunity, made possible the design of the research in a way that avoids the access to privileged corporate information. The study adopted a relatively simple three-step methodology. Firstly, two subsamples of companies are assembled, one composed of companies with shareholders loans increases; the other, the control sample, companies with loans decreases. The global sample is the sum of the two subsamples and composed of pairs of firms belonging to the same industry and year, and having identical size, but differentiating in the sign of the change in shareholders loans. Secondly, based on the traces invoiceless sales leave in the accounting numbers companies are classified according their fraud behavior, into groups of "fraudster" and "non fraudster", based on predictions of their abnormal cash flow from operations and cost of goods sold. Thirdly, a model is built and regressed to test the relationship between companies’ fraud behavior underlying invoiceless sales and the sign of shareholders loans change.

The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of a positive relationship between shareholders loans increases and accounting and tax fraud through invoiceless sales. The evidence suggests that at least a part of those loans is related to this fraud, and they are the vehicle for "laundering" the proceeds of informal transactions and, simultaneously, for keeping financially solvable the involved companies.

The current study makes four main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it brings a novel perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature (e.g. DeFond, 2010), highlighting an economic and corporate context of under-invoicing sales, in the limit invoiceless sales, that is not the usual context related to imports and

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Footnote:

10 Two-digit codes of industry classification (CAE v.3): 27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment; 28 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment; 35 - Electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold water and cold air; 36 - Collection, purification and distribution of water; 51 - Air transport; 53 - Postal and courier activities; 61 – Telecommunications; and 92 - Lotteries and other betting games.
exports activities and the attached use of transfer prices (e.g. Biswas & Marjit, 2005; Patnaik & Vasudevan, 2000). Secondly, it shows that in the particular context described in the paper shareholders loans are used as a way of “laundering” the proceeds of invoiceless sales, serving simultaneously to keep companies solvable. This double purpose of the technique usage is in itself also a novelty in the literature, contributing for a better perception of what can be in this particular context the determinants underlying the choice of the vehicles to reintroduce illicit money in the formal economy. Thirdly, adopting a design and research tools borrowed from the earnings management literature to study a fraud problem, our paper also brings a contribution by relating somewhat that literature to the one on fraud (e.g. DeFond, 2010). Fourthly, based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies, our study also makes a contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely in the way tax evasion evolves in this region (e.g. Richardson, 2006).

This study is of particular interest for the Portuguese Tax Authority, because of the contribution it makes to a better understanding of Portuguese business reality and the relation between companies, buyers and that Authority. However, its interest is geographically broader because it may be helpful for similar authorities in other countries facing similar challenges in coping with tax evasion and “money laundering”.

Nevertheless, the current research is not exempt of limitations. The most prominent is the way companies are classified as fraudster by invoiceless sales. Although the economic intuition is strong and there is anecdotal evidence on the issue, we recognize there is space for using new and more elaborated proxies to do such classification. This is left as a path for future research.

References


